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ABSTRACT
Some booms in housing prices are followed by busts. Others are not. In either case it is difficult to
find observable fundamentals that are correlated with price movements. We develop a model consistent
with these observations. Agents have heterogeneous expectations about long-run fundamentals but
change their views because of "social dynamics." Agents meet randomly. Those with tighter priors
are more likely to convert others to their beliefs. The model generates a "fad": the fraction of the population
with a particular view rises and then falls. Depending on which agent is correct about fundamentals,
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Some booms in housing prices are followed by busts. Others are not. In either case it is di¢ -
cult to ￿nd observable fundamentals that are correlated with price movements. We develop
a model that is consistent with these observations. Agents have heterogeneous expectations
about long-run fundamentals but change their views because of ￿social dynamics￿ . Agents
meet randomly and those with tighter priors are more likely to convert other agents to their
beliefs. The model generates a ￿fad￿in the sense that the fraction of the population with a
particular view rises and then falls. Depending on which agent is correct about fundamentals,
these fads generate boom-busts or protracted booms.
Models in which agents have homogeneous expectations can generate large di⁄erences in
house prices across steady states with di⁄erent fundamentals such as borrowing constraints,
income growth, demographics, transactions costs, and zoning (see e.g. Chu (2009)). How-
ever, it is di¢ cult to generate protracted price movements in models with homogeneous
expectations because expected changes in future fundamentals are quickly capitalized into
prices. Booms and busts can be generated by assuming that agents ￿rst receive increas-
ingly positive signals about future fundamentals and then increasingly negative signals. But
the problem with this approach is that for many episodes it is di¢ cult to ￿nd observable
fundamentals that are correlated with house price movements.1
The model that we develop has three key features. First, there is uncertainty about the
long-run fundamentals that drive house prices. We assume that in each period, there is a
small probability that housing fundamentals will change permanently to a new value. This
emphasis on long-run fundamentals is related to the literature on long-run risk (Bansal and
Yaron (2004), and Hansen, Heaton, and Li (2008)).
Second, as in Harrison and Kreps (1976), Scheinkman and Xiong (2003), Acemoglu,
Chernozhukov, and Yildiz (2007), and Geanakoplos (2010), agents in our economy have
heterogenous beliefs about fundamentals. Some agents believe that housing fundamentals
will improve while others don￿ t. Agents can update their priors in a Bayesian fashion. But
the data do not convey useful information about long-run fundamentals, so the priors of
di⁄erent agents remain constant over time. In other words, agents agree to disagree and this
disagreement persists over time. One set of agents is correct in their views but there is no
1Glaeser and Gyourko (2006) argue that it is di¢ cult to explain the large changes in housing prices over
time with changes in incomes, amenities or interest rates.
1way to know ex-ante which set that is.
The third feature of the model is an element which we refer to as ￿social dynamics.￿
Agents meet randomly with each other and some agents change their priors about long-run
fundamentals as a result of these meetings. We use the entropy of an agent￿ s probability
distribution of future fundamentals to measure the uncertainty of his views. We assume
that when agent i meets agent j, the probability that agent i adopts the prior of agent j
is decreasing (increasing) in the entropy of agent i￿ s (agent j￿ s) priors. Agents with tighter
priors are more likely to convert other agents to their beliefs. Our model generates dynamics
in the fraction of agents who hold di⁄erent views that are similar to those generated by the
infectious disease models proposed by Bernoulli (1766) and Kermack and McKendrick (1927).
Taken together, the second and third features of the model generate non-trivial dynamics in
the volume of transactions, with home sales and prices displaying a sharp positive correlation.
We consider two cases. In the ￿rst case the agents with the tightest priors are those who
expect fundamentals to remain the same. In the second case, agents with the tightest priors
are those who expect fundamentals to improve. Absent realization of uncertainty about
long-run fundamentals, the model generates fads. In the ￿rst case there is a rise and fall in
the number of people who believe that buying a house is a good investment. Here the model
generates a protracted boom-bust cycle. In the second case there is a rise and fall in the
number of people who believe that housing fundamentals will not change. Here, the model
generates a protracted boom in housing prices that is not followed by a bust.
We use the model to compute the price path expected by di⁄erent agents. These uncon-
ditional expected price paths take into account the probability of uncertainty being realized
at di⁄erent points in time. Regardless of which agent happens to be correct the model has
the following implications. Agents who think that fundamentals will improve expect prices
to rise and then level o⁄. Agents who think fundamentals will not change expect prices to
rise and then fall. An econometrician taking repeated samples from data generated by the
model would see both boom-busts and booms that are not followed by busts. The boom-bust
episodes occur in economies where agents who don￿ t expect fundamentals to improve happen
to be correct. The episodes in which booms are not followed by busts occur in economies
where those agents who expect fundamentals to improve happen to be correct. Of course,
in any given economy the econometrician could not predict ex-ante which type of episode
he would see. That is because before uncertainty is realized, the data are not informative
2about which agent is correct.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we provide some empirical background
about the nature of housing booms and busts. In Section 3 we describe our model of social
dynamics and its implications for the behavior of housing prices. We do so in a frictionless
model of the housing market. While useful for building intuition, the model is too stylized
to account for various features of the data. For this reason we consider in Section 4 a simple
matching model of the housing market and describe its transition dynamics. In Section 5 we
incorporate social dynamics into the matching model and generate our main results. Section
6 concludes.
2. Boom-bust cycles in housing prices: background evidence
In this section we document some key empirical regularities about boom-bust cycles in hous-
ing prices using aggregate time-series data for di⁄erent countries. Our evidence complements
the already extensive literature that uses microeconomic data to analyze particular boom-
bust episodes (see e.g. Mian and Su￿(2010) and Barlevy and Fisher (2010)).
An operational de￿nition of a boom or a bust requires that we de￿ne turning points
where upturns and downturns in housing prices begin. To avoid de￿ning high-frequency
movements in the data as upturns or downturns, we ￿rst smooth the data. Let yt denote the
logarithm of an index of real housing prices. Also let xt denote the centered-moving average
of yt; xt =
Pn
j=￿n yt+j. We de￿ne an upturn as an interval of time in which ￿xt > 0 for all
t and a downturn as an interval of time in which ￿xt < 0: A turning point is the last time
period within an upturn or downturn. A boom is an upturn for which yT ￿yT￿L > z, and a
bust is a downturn for which yT ￿yT￿L < ￿z. Here T is the date at which the boom or bust
ended, L is the length of the boom or bust and z is a positive scalar. The results discussed
below are generated assuming n = 5 and z = 0:15 but the ￿ndings are not sensitive to small
changes in these parameters.
We implement our procedure using quarterly OECD data on real house prices for 18
countries over the period 1970 to 2009.2 These indices have been normalized so they have an
average value of 100 in all countries. Figure 1 displays the data. Three features of these data
2While our data spans the last four decades, boom-bust episodes in housing prices are a much older
phenomenon. Ambrose, Eichholtz, Lindenthal (2010) document the existence of such episodes in Holland
over a period of four centuries. Similarly, Eitrheim and Erlandsen (2004) provide analogous evidence for
Norway over a period of two centuries.
3are worth noting. First, every country in our sample experienced housing price booms and
busts.3 The median sizes of booms and busts are 54 and 29 percent, respectively. Second,
booms and busts occur over protracted periods of time. The median lengths of booms and
busts in our sample are 61
4 years and 5 years, respectively. Third, in many cases booms are
followed by protracted busts. But not always: in 26 out of 49 boom episodes a boom is not
followed by a bust.4 A successful theory should recognize this fact.
3. Social dynamics in a frictionless model
In this section we consider a simple frictionless model of the housing market. We use this
set up to introduce our model of social dynamics and the implied movements in the fraction
of agents with di⁄erent beliefs about long-run fundamentals.
The model economy The economy is populated by a continuum of agents with measure
one. All agents have linear utility and discount utility at rate ￿. Agents are either home-
owners or renters. We assume that each agent can only own one house and that there is no
short-selling. The ￿rst assumption is made for simplicity. The second assumption is moti-
vated by the fact that in practice it is not possible to short sell houses. This characteristic
of houses distinguishes it from other asset classes, such as stocks, which are easier to short
sell.
For simplicity, we assume that there is a ￿xed stock of houses, k < 1, in the economy. This
assumption is motivated by the observation that large booms and busts occur in cities where
increases in the supply of houses are limited by zoning laws, land scarcity, or infrastructure
constraints.5 There is a rental market with 1 ￿ k houses. These units are produced by
competitive ￿rms at a cost of w per period, so the rental rate is constant and equal to
w. The momentary utilities associated with owning and renting a house are "h and "r,
respectively. We assume that the utility of owning a home is higher than the net utility of
renting ("h > "r ￿ w) so that home prices are positive.
We ￿rst consider the equilibrium of the economy when there is no uncertainty. Agents
decide at time t whether they will be renters or home owners at time t + 1. The net utility
3Australia and Germany only experienced booms and a bust, respectively.
4This fraction is almost certainly a⁄ected by the fact that our sample ends in 2009 and so misses part of
the ongoing declines in home prices.
5See, e.g. Glaeser, Gyourko, and Saks (2005), Quigley and Raphael (2005), Barlevy and Fisher (2010),
and Saiz (2010).
4of being a renter at time t + 1 is "r ￿ w. If an agent buys a house at time t he pays Pt. He
lives in the home at time t + 1 and receives a utility ￿ ow "h. He can then sell the house at
the end of period t + 1 for a price Pt+1. Since all agents are identical, in equilibrium they







r ￿ w). (3.1)





where " = "h ￿ ("r ￿ w).
We now consider an experiment that captures the e⁄ects of infrequent changes in the
value of housing fundamentals. Examples include low-frequency changes in the growth rate
of productivity which a⁄ects agents￿wealth and changes in ￿nancial regulation or innovations
which make it easier for agents to purchase homes. For concreteness we focus on the utility
of owning a home. Suppose that before time zero the economy is in a steady state with no
uncertainty, so Pt = P. At time zero agents learn that in each period, with small probability
￿, the value of " will change permanently to a new level "￿. Agents agree about the value of
￿ but disagree about the probability distribution for "￿. Agents do not receive information
that is useful for updating their priors about the distribution of "￿.7 As soon as uncertainty
is resolved agents become homogeneous in terms of their beliefs.
Prior to the resolution of uncertainty, agents fall into three categories depending on their
priors about "￿. Borrowing from the terminology used in the epidemiology literature we refer
to these agents as ￿infected,￿￿cured,￿and ￿vulnerable.￿We denote by it, ct, and vt the time
t fraction of infected, cured and vulnerable agents, respectively. Agent types are indexed
by j = i;c;v and are assumed to be publicly observable. Priors are common knowledge,
so higher-order beliefs play no role in our model. The laws of social dynamics described
below are public information. Agents take into account future changes in the fractions of
the population that hold di⁄erent views.
6It is well known that there are explosive solutions to equation (3.1) (see, e.g. Diba and Grossman (1988)).
We abstract from these solutions in our analysis.
7If agents disagreed about the value of ￿ they would update their priors about ￿ after observing whether
a change in fundamentals occurred. We abstract from uncertainty about the value of ￿ to focus our analysis
on the importance of social dynamics.
5The new value of the ￿ ow utility of owning a home, "￿, is drawn from the set ￿. For
simplicity we assume that this set contains n elements. An agent of type j attaches the
probability distribution function (pdf) fj("￿) to the elements of ￿.
We assume that at time zero there is a very small fraction of cured and infected agents.
Almost all agents are vulnerable, i.e. they have di⁄use priors about future fundamentals.










For now we assume that agents do not take into account that they might change their
type as a result of social interactions. This assumption rules out the possibility that agents
might take actions that are optimal only because they might change their type in the future.
For example, a cured agent might buy a home, even though this action is not optimal given
his current priors, in anticipation of the possibility that he could become infected in the
future. We return to this issue at the end of this section.
We use the entropy of the probability distribution fj("￿) to measure the uncertainty of
















The higher is the value of ej, the greater is an agent￿ s uncertainty about "￿. This uncertainty
is maximal when the pdf is uniform, in which case ej = ln(n).
Agents meet randomly at the beginning of the period. When agent l meets agent j, agent
j adopts the priors of agent l with probability ￿lj. The value of ￿lj depends on the ratio of
the entropies of the agents￿pdfs:
￿
lj = max(1 ￿ e
l=e
j;0). (3.3)
This equation implies that a low-entropy agent will not adopt the prior of a high-entropy
agent. In addition, it implies that the probability that a high-entropy agent adopts the priors
of the low-entropy agent is decreasing in the ratio of the two entropies (el=ej). We adopt
this formulation for two reasons. First, it strikes us as plausible. Second, it is consistent
6with evidence from the psychology literature that people are more persuaded by those who
are con￿dent (e.g. Price and Stone (2004) and Sniezek and Van Swol (2001)).
Throughout we assume that the entropy of the vulnerable agents exceeds the entropy of







In addition, we make the natural assumption that most agents are vulnerable at time zero
and that the initial number of infected and cured agents is small but identical: i0 = c0.
The population dynamics in our model are similar to the dynamics in the infectious
disease models of Bernoulli (1766) and Kermack and McKendrick (1927).8 We consider two
cases to analyze the equilibrium in which either the cured or the infected agents have the
lowest entropy. In both cases, if uncertainty is not resolved, the entire population converges
to the view of the agent with the lowest entropy. The model generates a ￿fad￿in the sense
that the fraction of the population with a particular view rises and then falls.





The fraction of the population with di⁄erent views evolves according to:
it+1 = it + ￿
ivitvt ￿ ￿
ciitct; (3.4)
ct+1 = ct + ￿
cvctvt + ￿
ciitct, (3.5)
vt+1 = vt ￿ ￿
ivitvt ￿ ￿
cvctvt. (3.6)
To understand equation (3.4) note that there are itvt encounters between infected and
vulnerable agents.9 As a result of these encounters, ￿ivitvt vulnerable agents become infected.
Similarly, there are ctit encounters between cured and infected at time t. As a result of these
encounters, ￿cictit infected agents become cured. These two sets of encounters, together with
it, ct, and vt determine it+1.
8Bernoulli (1766) used his model of the spread of smallpox to show that vaccination would result in a sig-
ni￿cant increase in life expectancy. When vaccination was introduced, insurance companies used Bernoulli￿ s
life-expectancy calculations to revise the price of annuity contracts (Dietz and Heesterbeek (2002)).
9See Du¢ e and Sun (2007) for a law of large numbers that applies to pairwise random meetings.
7Consider next equation (3.5). There are itct encounters between cured and infected
agents which lead to ￿ciitct infected agents becoming cured. The are also ctvt encounters
between cured and vulnerable agents which lead to ￿cvctvt vulnerable agents becoming cured.
Finally, equation (3.6) re￿ ects the fact that ￿ivitvt vulnerable agents become infected and
￿cvctvt become cured.
In case 1 the model can generate a ￿fad￿in which the number of infected agents rises for
a while before declining towards zero. To see how this pattern emerges, suppose that initially
a large fraction of the population is vulnerable and that ￿ivv0 > ￿cic0. In conjunction with
equation (3.4) the latter condition implies that initially the fraction of infected agents grows
over time.
Also, consider a path of the economy in which uncertainty is not realized. Along this path
the number of infected agents initially rises over time as the number of vulnerable agents
who become infected is larger than the number of infected agents who become cured (see
equation (3.4)). The number of vulnerable agents falls over time as some of these agents
become infected and others become cured (see equation (3.6)). Eventually, ￿ivvt < ￿cict. At
this point the fraction of infected agents begins to fall. It follows from equation (3.5) that
all agents become cured as t ! 1.





The fraction of the population with di⁄erent views evolves according to:
it+1 = it + ￿
ivitvt + ￿
icitct, (3.7)
ct+1 = ct + ￿
cvctvt ￿ ￿
icitct, (3.8)
vt+1 = vt ￿ ￿
ivitvt ￿ ￿
cvctvt. (3.9)
To understand equation (3.7) note that the itvt encounters between infected and vulnera-
ble agents lead to ￿ivitvt vulnerable agents becoming infected. There are also itct encounters
between infected and cured which lead to ￿icitct cured agents becoming infected. In equation
(3.8) the itct encounters between cured and infected agents at time t result in ￿icitct cured
agents becoming infected. The ctvt encounters between cured and vulnerable agents at time
t result in ￿cvctvt vulnerable agents become cured. Finally, equation (3.9) re￿ ects the fact
that ￿ivitvt vulnerable agents become infected and ￿cvctvt become cured.
8This version of the model also generates a ￿fad￿but here it is the number of cured agents
that rises for a while before declining towards zero. A fad arises when initially a large fraction
of the population is vulnerable and ￿cvvt > ￿icit. The basic di⁄erence between case 1 and
case 2 is that in the latter case cured agents are being converted into infected agents, so that
eventually all agents become infected.
Equilibrium in the frictionless model House prices are determined by the marginal
buyer. To determine the identity of this buyer we sort agents in declining order of how much
they value houses. The marginal buyer is the agent who is at the kth percentile of house
valuations. When the fraction of infected agents is lower than k for all t, the marginal home
buyer is a non-infected agent. Since these agents do not expect changes in the utility of
owning a home, the price is constant over time at the value given by equation (3.2). In order
to generate a boom-bust cycle, at least k percent of the agents must be infected at some
point in time.
It is useful to de￿ne the time-t fundamental value of a house before the resolution of
uncertainty for a given agent, assuming that this agent is the marginal buyer until uncertainty
is resolved. We denote these fundamental values for the infected, cured and vulnerable agents
by P i
t, P v
t , and P c
t , respectively. The value of P i


















The logic that underlies this equation is as follows. With probability ￿ uncertainty is resolved.
In this case the expected utility ￿ ow and house price at time t+1 are Ei("￿) and ￿Ei("￿)=(1￿
￿), respectively. With probability 1 ￿ ￿ uncertainty is not resolved. In this case the agent
derives a utility ￿ ow, ", and values the house at P i
t+1. Since we are deriving the fundamental
value under the assumption that the infected agent is always the marginal home buyer,
P i
t = P i




￿Ei("￿)=(1 ￿ ￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)"
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
. (3.11)







We begin by characterizing the equilibrium of the economy in case 1. Suppose that the
fraction of infected agents rises above k for t 2 [t1, t2], where t2 < 1. For t > t2 the cured
9agents are the marginal home buyers. So, the price is given by:
Pt = P c; for t ￿ t2 + 1. (3.13)
Using Pt2+1 as a terminal value we can compute recursively the prices for t ￿ t2 that obtain
if uncertainty is not realized. Since the infected agent is the marginal home buyer between
period t1 and period t2 we have:
Pt = ￿f￿[Ei("￿ + P ￿
t+1)] + (1 ￿ ￿)(" + Pt+1)g; for t1 ￿ t ￿ t2.
Here Pt+1 and P ￿
t+1 are the t+1 prices when uncertainty is not realized and when uncertainty
is realized, respectively.
Since the vulnerable agents are the marginal home buyers for t < t1, we have:
Pt = ￿f￿[Ec("￿ + P ￿
t+1)] + (1 ￿ ￿)(" + Pt+1)g; for t < t1.
Here we use the fact that: Ec("￿) = Ev("￿).
The following proposition characterizes the equilibrium for this model.






P c + [￿(1 ￿ ￿)]
t1￿t (Pt1 ￿ P c), t < t1,
P i ￿ [￿(1 ￿ ￿)]
t2+1￿t (P i ￿ P c), t1 ￿ t ￿ t2,
P c, t > t2.
(3.14)





The intuition for this proposition is as follows. Before time t1 the marginal buyer is
a vulnerable agent. If uncertainty is not realized, the marginal buyer at time t1 is an
infected agent. The latter agent is willing to buy the house at a value that exceeds P c.
The price of a house re￿ ects this expected capital gain, Pt1 ￿ P c. This capital gain is
realized with probability (1 ￿ ￿)t1￿t. So the expected, discounted capital gain is given by:
[￿(1 ￿ ￿)]
t1￿t (Pt1 ￿ P c). Therefore, the equilibrium price is equal to P c plus this capital
gain (￿rst line of equation (3.14)). Note that the price jumps at time zero from P c to
P c+[￿(1 ￿ ￿)]
t1 (Pt1 ￿P c) because of the expected capital gains associated with the change
in the marginal buyer at time t1. As long as uncertainty is not realized, the price rises before
time t1 re￿ ecting the fact that the expected, discounted capital gain is rising at rate ￿(1￿￿).
10Between time t1 and t2 the marginal buyer is an infected agent. However, if uncertainty
is not realized, the marginal buyer at time t2 is a cured agent who is willing to buy the house
at a price P c < P i. The equilibrium price is equal to P i minus the expected, discounted
capital loss, [￿(1 ￿ ￿)]
t2￿t (P i ￿P c) (second line of equation (3.14)). As long as uncertainty
is not realized, the price falls before t2 + 1 re￿ ecting the fact that the expected, discounted
capital loss is rising at rate ￿(1 ￿ ￿).
After time t2 + 1 there are no more changes in the identity of the marginal buyer. So,
unless uncertainty is realized, the price remains constant and equal to the fundamental value
of a house to a cured agent, P c.
Finally, once uncertainty is realized, agents have homogeneous expectations so all funda-
mental values coincide and the price of a house is given by equation (3.15).
Proposition 3.1 implies that the model generates a boom-bust cycle in house prices as
long as uncertainty is not realized. Of course, the model can also generate a boom-bust as
well as a boom-no-bust path depending upon when uncertainty is realized and the realization
of "￿. We view these possibilities as less interesting because of the di¢ culty of identifying
observable fundamentals that covary with house prices.
The following proposition characterizes the equilibrium price path in case 2. Recall that,
in this case, the fraction of the population that is infected converges monotonically to one.
We de￿ne t1 as the ￿rst time period at which it ￿ k. The behavior of prices is summarized
by the following proposition.




P c + [￿(1 ￿ ￿)]
t1￿t (P i ￿ P c), t < t1,
P i, t ￿ t1.
(3.16)





The intuition for this proposition is as follows. After time t1, until uncertainty is resolved,
the marginal home buyer is an infected agent. So, absent resolution of uncertainty the price
is equal to P i for all t ￿ t1. Before t1 the marginal home buyer is a vulnerable/cured
agent who has a fundamental house value P c. The equilibrium price is equal to P c plus
the discounted expected value of the capital gain that results from selling the house to an
infected agent at time t1, [￿(1 ￿ ￿)]
t1￿t (P i ￿ P c).
11A simple numerical example We now consider a simple numerical example that il-
lustrates the properties of the model summarized in the previous proposition. In case 1
equations (3.5)-(3.6) imply that the maximum value of it is 50 percent. So, the presence
of infected agents a⁄ects prices only if k < 0:5. In the following example we assume that
k = 0:1.
We use the beta distribution to guide our choice of pdfs over "￿ for the di⁄erent agents in
the economy. This family of continuous distributions, which depends on two parameters, x
and y, is very ￿ exible and includes the uniform distribution as a particular case. We denote
by xj and yj the parameters of the beta distribution of agent j.10
To simplify our computations we work with a discrete approximation to the beta distri-
butions de￿ned on a symmetric grid with six points. To compute the probability of each of
these points we divide the support of the distribution into six intervals of equal size and com-
pute the integral of the beta distribution over these intervals. The support of the distribution
corresponds to the mid points of the di⁄erent intervals.11
Our choice of parameters xj and yj are such that the discretized beta distributions imply:
Ev("￿) = Ec("￿) = 2:9, Ei("￿) = 8:5. We think of a time period as one month and choose ￿
so that the implied annual discount rate is six percent. We assume that there is a very small
number of infected and cured natural renters at time zero: i0 = c0 = 10￿5. The remainder
of the population is vulnerable. We choose ￿, the probability that uncertainty is realized in
each period, to equal 1=120. Absent resolution of uncertainty this value, together with our
other assumptions, implies that a boom-bust pattern emerges over the course of roughly 20
years. Our value of ￿ implies that the probability of observing such a boom-bust pattern is
roughly 13 percent.
Case 1 Here our choice of xj and yj imply:
e
i = 0:82, e
c = 0:81, and e
v = 0:93,
￿
ci = 0:010, ￿
iv = 0:116, and ￿
cv = 0:125.
Panel (a) of Figure 2 shows the evolution of the fraction of cured, infected and vulnerable
agents absent resolution of uncertainty about "￿. The fraction of infected agents in the pop-
ulation initially increases slowly. The infection then gathers momentum until the fraction of
10We assume that the support of the distribution is the interval [0; 10]. The pdf of infected, cured and
vulnerable agents are parameterized by: xi = 2:4, yi = 0:3, xc = 9:35, yc = 22:4, xv = 7:0, and yv = 16:8.
11The support is given by: "￿ 2 f0:83, 2:50, 4:17, 5:83, 7:50, 9:17g.
12infected agents peaks at 29 percent in year eight. Thereafter this fraction declines eventually
reaching zero. Between t1, the middle of year eight, and t2, the beginning of year 19, the
infected agents are the marginal buyers since they exceed a fraction k percent of the popu-
lation. The fraction of vulnerable agents falls over time and converges towards zero as these
agents become either cured or infected. The fraction of cured agents rises monotonically
over time until everybody in the economy is cured.
The intuition for these dynamics is as follows. Since the vulnerable agents have the
highest entropy, both infected and cured agents can convert the vulnerable agents to their
views. The entropy of the cured agents is only slightly lower than that of the infected agents.
By assumption there are initially very few infected and cured agents. Since the probability
of these agents meeting is very small, very few infected agents become cured. Initially, both
the fraction of cured and infected agents grows because there is a large pool of vulnerable
agents for them to convert. Eventually, the number of vulnerable agents falls and very few
vulnerable agents became newly infected. Because there is a large pool of cured agents, the
probability that an infected agent meets a cured agents becomes substantial. Consequently,
the number of infected agents that become cured rises. With low in￿ ows and high out￿ ows
the fraction of infected agents asymptotes to zero. So, in this case we observe a ￿ fad￿in the
sense that the number of infected agents initially rises and then declines.
Consistent with Proposition 3.1, Figure 3 shows that the price jumps at time zero and
then continues to rise slowly until infected agents become the marginal home buyers at time
t1. Thereafter the price drops rapidly, reverting to its initial steady-state value.
Figure 3 also displays the one-period-ahead annualized rate of return that di⁄erent agents
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The Figure also displays the volume of transactions implied by the model computed under
the assumption that trade only occurs when at least one of the agents has a motive for
transacting.
A key feature of Figure 3 is that agents have heterogeneous beliefs about the expected
rate of return to housing. This basic feature of our model is consistent with the ￿ndings
in Piazzesi and Schneider (2009) who document such heterogeneity using data from the
Michigan Survey of Consumers.12
12Vissing-Jłrgensen (2003) provides evidence for substantial heterogeneity of beliefs regarding the returns
13The annualized real rate of return to the marginal home owner is constant and equal to
six percent. Before t1 the cured/vulnerable agents are the marginal home owners. Infected
agents expect very high rates of return which re￿ ects a high value of Ei ("￿). So all newly
infected agents (￿ivitvt) buy homes.13 During this period prices are rising and all transactions
are initiated by agents who buy homes. Prices and transaction volume simultaneously peak
at time t1.
Between time t1 and t2 the infected agents are the marginal buyers. During this period
of time the cured/vulnerable agents expect negative rates of return because they have a low
expected value of "￿. So all newly cured agents (￿cictit) sell their homes to infected agents
who are indi⁄erent between buying and holding. During this period prices are falling and
all transactions are initiated by agents who sell homes. Figure 3 displays the time series
of transactions volume. Notice that prices and transactions volume simultaneously peak at
time t1. Transaction volume collapses once prices start to fall because at this point infected
agents own all the houses. After time t1 the number of transactions recovers as some infected
agents become cured and sell their homes.
After time t2 the cured/vulnerable agents are once again the marginal home owners and
infected agents expect very high rates of return that are not re￿ ected in market prices. So,
￿ivitvt agents buy homes. But, because there are so few vulnerable agents the number of
transactions is close to zero.
From Figure 3 we see that, while the identity of the marginal home owner changes over
time, the rate of return to the marginal owner is ￿xed and constant at six percent. There
is heterogeneity in agents￿expected rate of return to housing. However, since pricing is
determined by the marginal owner, the expectations of inframarginal agents are not re￿ ected
in home prices.
Finally, Figure 3 displays the price paths expected by infected and cured/vulnerable
agents at time zero. These paths are given by:
E
j
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for j = i, c, v.
to other assets such as stocks.
13We assume that the vulnerable agents sell since they are indi⁄erent between holding and selling. The
infected agents could induce them to sell by o⁄erering an arbitrarially small premium. Some infected agents
become cured during this time period. However, for t ￿ t1 infected agents who become cured are indi⁄erent
between holding and selling, so we assume that they do not transact.
14Infected agents expect prices to rise very rapidly until time t1. Thereafter expected
prices continue to rise but at a diminished rate re￿ ecting the fall in actual market prices if
uncertainty is not realized. The fall in market prices is outweighed by the large rise in "￿
that infected agents expect. Finally, expected prices rise at a slightly higher rate after time
t2, re￿ ecting the fact that the price remains constant if uncertainty is not realized.
Consider next the price path expected by cured and vulnerable agents at time zero.
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So, the entire di⁄erence between Ei
0(Pt) and Ec
0(Pt) re￿ ects agents￿di⁄erent expectations
about "￿. This di⁄erence implies that cured/vulnerable agents always expect a lower price
than infected agents. The cured/vulnerable agents expect prices to rise between time zero
and time t1 because the price appreciation that occurs as long as uncertainty is not realized
outweighs the fall in price that occurs if uncertainty is realized. Between time t1 and t2
the latter e⁄ect outweighs the ￿rst e⁄ect and the cured/vulnerable agents expect prices to
fall. After time t2 the market price corresponds to the cured/vulnerable agent￿ s fundamental
price so prices are expected to be constant.
Case 2 Here our choice of xj and yj implies:14
e
i = 0:81, e
c = 0:82, and e
v = 0:93,
￿
ic = 0:010, ￿
iv = 0:125, and ￿
cv = 0:116.
Panel (b) of Figure 2 shows the evolution of the fraction of cured, infected, and vulnerable
agents absent resolution of uncertainty about "￿. The dynamics are the same as in panel
(a) of Figure 2 except that the cured and infected have changed places. Here there is a fad
in the sense that the number of cured agents rises for roughly eight years before falling to
zero. The fraction of infected agents rises monotonically over time until everybody in the
economy is infected.
Consistent with Proposition 3.2, Figure 4 shows that the price jumps at time zero and
then continues to rise until the beginning of year ￿ve, when all homes are owned by infected
agents. Thereafter the price is constant and equal to the infected agent￿ s fundamental value.
14The pdf of infected, cured and vulnerable agents are parameterized by: xc = 2:4, yc = 0:3, xi = 9:35,
yi = 22:4, xv = 7:0, and yv = 16:8.
15Figure 4 also shows the volume of transactions implied by the model. At time zero all
homes are owned by vulnerable agents. Between time zero and time t1 all newly infected
agents (￿ivitvt) buy homes. At time t1 all of the homes are owned by infected agents and
there are no new transactions because infected agents do not become cured.
Finally, Figure 4 displays the price path expected by infected and cured/vulnerable agents
at time zero. This path is computed using equation (3.19). Infected agents expect prices to
rise very rapidly until t1. From this point on the expected price continues to rise because
the probability that uncertainty is realized and infected agents receive a large capital gain
increases with the time horizon. Figure 4 also displays the price path expected by cured and
vulnerable agents at time zero. As in case 1, the entire di⁄erence between Ei
0(Pt) and Ec
0(Pt)
re￿ ects di⁄erent expectations about "￿ (see equation (3.20)).
Interpreting cross-sectional data on housing prices A salient feature of the data on
house prices is the presence of both boom-bust episodes and episodes in which booms are
not followed by busts. Our model is consistent with this feature of the data. Regardless
of whether we are in case 1 or case 2, infected agents expect prices to rise and eventually
level o⁄, while cured agents expect prices to rise and then fall. An econometrician taking
repeated samples from our data would see both boom-busts and booms that are not followed
by busts. The boom-bust episodes would occur in economies where the cured agents happen
to be correct. The booms that are not followed by busts would occur in economies where
the infected agents happen to be right. Of course, in any given economy the econometrician
cannot predict ex-ante which type of episode he would see. That is because by construction
the data are not informative about which agent is correct.
An alternative interpretation of social dynamics We conclude this section by describ-
ing an alternative environment which generates social dynamics that are similar to those of
our model. In this example agents have heterogeneous priors and receive private signals.
Suppose that the agents who are initially infected and cured have very sharp priors. Agents
that are initially vulnerable have very di⁄use priors. All agents receive uninformative private
signals. Vulnerable agents have sharp priors that the posteriors of infected and cured agents
are the product of initially di⁄use priors and very informative signals. So, when a vulnerable
agent meets an infected (cured) agent his posterior becomes arbitrarily close to that of the
infected (cured) agent. We refer to a vulnerable agent who has a posterior that is very close
16to that of an infected (cured) agent as infected (cured).
We reinterpret ￿lj as the probability that agents of type l meet agents of type j. We
assume that ￿vc = ￿vi = ￿ and that ￿ci = 0, i.e. cured and infected agents have no social
interactions. Under our assumptions the dynamics of the fraction of population with di⁄erent
views are similar to those generated by our model of social dynamics. Our assumptions
about ￿lj eliminate the convergence of posteriors that is a generic property of Bayesian
environments. As a result, we preserve the property that di⁄erent agents agree to disagree.15
To obtain dynamics similar to cases 1 and 2 we need to introduce a slight asymmetry between
cured and infected agents. A simple, albeit mechanical, way to introduce this asymmetry is
to suppose that in case 1 (case 2) a small fraction ￿ of infected (cured) agents exogenously
change their view to those of cured (infected) agents.
The view of social segmentation embodied in our assumptions about ￿lj is consistent with
the notion that agents who are strongly committed to a point of view limit their interactions
to sources of information and individuals that are likely to con￿rm their own views. This
phenomenon is discussed by Sunstein (2001) and Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005). The
latter authors summarize research in psychology, communications and information theory
that is consistent with the social-segmentation hypothesis. More recently, Gentzkow and
Shapiro (2010) ￿nd evidence that people tend to have close social interactions with people
who have similar political views. Social segmentation is related to what sociologists call
￿homophily￿ : contact between similar people occurs at a higher rate than contact among
dissimilar people (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, Cook (2001)).
Internalizing changes in agent type So far we have assumed that agents do not take
into account that they may change their type as a result of social interactions. Here we assess
the quantitative impact of this assumption by calculating equilibrium prices when agents do
internalize the possibility that they may change their type.
In case 1, absent resolution of uncertainty, all agents become cured as t goes to in￿nity
and the terminal price is equal to the fundamental price of a cured agent (P c in equation
(3.12)). In case 2, absent resolution of uncertainty, all agents become infected as t goes to
in￿nity and the terminal price is equal to the fundamental price of an infected agent (P i in
equation (3.11)). Using these terminal prices we can compute the equilibrium price path in
15Acemoglu et al. (2007) provide an alternative environment in which agents agree to disagree because
they are uncertain about the interpretation of the signals that they receive.
17a recursive fashion.
When i(t) ￿ k infected agents are the marginal home owners. In this case the equilibrium
price is given by:
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Recall that Pt+1 and P ￿
t+1 are the t + 1 prices when uncertainty is not realized and when
uncertainty is realized, respectively. Here an infected agent takes into into account that with
probability ￿cict he becomes cured at time t+1 and values the house as a cured agent. The
value of ￿ci is positive in case 1 but equal to zero in case 2.
When i(t) < k and i(t) + v(t) ￿ k vulnerable agents are the marginal home owners even
if c(t) ￿ k. Vulnerable agents have higher valuations than cured agents because they have a
higher probability of becoming infected. In this case the equilibrium price is given by:
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Here the vulnerable agent takes into account that with probability ￿ivit he becomes infected
and values the house as an infected agent. Also, with probability ￿cvct he becomes cured
and values the house as a cured agent.
Finally, when i(t) < k and i(t) + v(t) < k the marginal home owner is a cured agent. In
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Here the cured agent takes into account that, with probability ￿icit he becomes infected and
values the house as an infected agent. Recall that ￿ic is zero in case 1 but it is positive in
case 2.
We redo the experiment that underlies Figure 3 using the same parameter values. The
basic ￿nding is that internalizing changes in agent type makes virtually no di⁄erence to our
results. The basic reason is that the probability of switching types is small. For instance, in
case 1 the maximum value of ￿ivit and ￿cict in our numerical example are three and one-third
18of one percent, respectively. In the following sections we abstract from this e⁄ect to simplify
our computations.
4. A matching model
The frictionless model shows the potential of social dynamics to account for the house price
dynamics observed in the data. However, it has three unattractive features. First, to generate
a boom-bust cycle in case 1, the fraction of agents that are infected must exceed k for at
least some period of time. According to the Housing Vacancy Survey of the Bureau of the
Census, the average fraction of American households who owned homes during the period
1965-2010 is 65 percent. So, the model requires that a very large fraction of the population
become infected.16 Second, the price rise that occurs at time zero is large relative to the
peak rise in prices. Third, the model is too stylized to account for the fact that the volume
of transactions and time to sell are highly correlated with average housing prices (see Stein
(1995)).
Here we model the housing market using an extended version of the matching model
proposed by Piazzesi and Schneider (2009). In this section we consider a version of the model
in which agents have homogeneous expectations. The basic structure of this model coincides
with that of the frictionless model described in Section 3. The economy is populated by a
continuum of agents with measure one. All agents have linear utility and discount utility at
rate ￿. There is a ￿xed stock of houses, k < 1, in the economy and a rental market with
1 ￿ k houses. Rental units are produced by competitive ￿rms at a cost w per period, so the
rental rate is constant and equal to w.
There are four types of agents in the economy: homeowners, home sellers, natural home
buyers, and natural renters. We denote the fraction of these agents in the population by
ht, ut, bt, and rt, respectively. Home owners and home sellers own homes at time t. In
equilibrium all homes are occupied so that:
ht + ut = k. (4.1)
16An alternative strategy for remedying this shortcoming is to allow for heterogeneity in the utility of
owning a home. For example, suppose there is a group of agents that would never sell their home because
they derive such a high utility from it. The presence of this group is equivalent to a reduction in k, so that
it is easier to generate a boom in the price of homes that are potentially for sale.
19Both natural buyers and natural renters rent homes at time t so that:
bt + rt = 1 ￿ k. (4.2)
We describe the state of the economy by st = fht;btg. We now discuss the problems faced
by the di⁄erent agents in the economy.
Homeowners A homeowner derives momentary utility " from his home. The agent￿ s value
function, H(st), is given by:
H(st) = " + ￿ [(1 ￿ ￿)H(st+1) + ￿U(st+1)]. (4.3)
With probability ￿ a homeowner￿ s match with his home goes sour and he becomes a home
seller. We denote the value function of a home seller by U(st).
Home sellers A home seller sells his home with probability p(st). Once the sale occurs,
the home seller becomes a natural renter. The home seller￿ s value function is given by:
U(st) = p(st)[P(st) + ￿R(st+1)] + [1 ￿ p(st)]￿U(st+1). (4.4)
Here P(st) is the expected price received by a home seller and R(st) is the value function of
a natural renter.
To simplify, we abstract from the transactions costs of selling a home. In addition, we
assume that the reservation price of a home seller, ￿ P u, is an exogenous constant. To ensure
that transactions occur in the steady state we require that ￿ P u be lower than the steady state
reservation price of natural buyers.
Natural home buyers A natural buyer is a renter at time t. He has to choose between
renting at t+1 or trying to buy a home. His net ￿ ow utility from renting is given by "b ￿w
and his value function is given by B(st). If he decides to continue renting, his value function,
Brent(st), is given by:
B
rent(st) = "
b ￿ w + ￿B(st+1). (4.5)
If he tries to buy a house, he succeeds with probability q(st). In this case, he pays a price
P b(st) and his continuation utility is that of a home owner ((1￿￿)H(st+1)+￿U(st+1)). With
20probability 1￿q(st), he does not succeed in buying a house and he remains a renter at time
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The reservation price, ￿ P b(st), is the price that makes a natural buyer indi⁄erent between
buying and renting:
￿ P
b(st) = ￿ [(1 ￿ ￿)H(st+1) + ￿U(st+1) ￿ B(st+1)]. (4.8)
Natural renters A natural renter is a renter at time t. His net ￿ ow utility from renting is
given by "r ￿w and his value function is R(st). The only di⁄erence between natural renters
and natural buyers is that the former derive lower utility from owning a home. We model
this di⁄erence by assuming that whenever natural renters buy a house they pay a ￿xed cost,
￿". This ￿xed cost represents the expected present value of the di⁄erence between their
utility from owning a home and the corresponding utility of a natural buyer.17 We choose
the value of ￿ so that it is not optimal for natural renters to buy a house in the steady state.
In each period a fraction ￿ of natural renters receive a preference shock and become
natural home buyers. A natural renter can choose whether to continue renting or to try to
buy a house. If he continues renting, his value function, Rrent(st), is given by:
R
rent(st) = "
r ￿ w + ￿ [(1 ￿ ￿)R(st+1) + ￿B(st+1)]. (4.9)
The continuation utility re￿ ects the fact that a natural renter becomes a natural home buyer
with probability ￿.
If the natural renter tries to buy a house, he succeeds with probability q(st). In this
case, he pays a price P r(st) and his continuation utility is the same as that of a home owner
((1 ￿ ￿)H(st+1) + ￿U(st+1)), except that he must pay the ￿xed cost ￿". With probability
17Since the ￿xed cost is paid upfront all home owners are identical. It does not matter whether they used
to be natural buyers or natural renters. This property simpli￿es our analysis by reducing the number of
di⁄erent agents in the economy.
211 ￿ q(st) the natural renter does not succeed in buying a house. In this case, he continues
to be a renter at time t + 1. The value function of a potential buyer, Rbuy(st), is given by:
R
buy(st) = q(st)f"
r ￿ w ￿ P
r(st) ￿ ￿" + ￿ [(1 ￿ ￿)H(st+1) + ￿U(st+1)]g
+(1 ￿ q(st))R
rent(st). (4.10)




The reservation price, ￿ P r(st), is the price that makes natural renters indi⁄erent between
buying and renting:
￿ P
r(st) = ￿ [(1 ￿ ￿)H(st+1) + ￿U(st+1)] ￿ ￿ [(1 ￿ ￿)R(st+1) + ￿B(st+1)] ￿ ￿". (4.12)
Timing The timing of events within a period is as follows. Preference shocks occur in
the beginning of the period. With probability ￿ home owners become home sellers. With
probability ￿ natural renters become natural buyers. Transactions occur at the end of the
period. A fraction p(st) of home sellers sell their home while a fraction q(st) of home buyers
buy a house.
We de￿ne the indicator function Jb(st) to take the value one if it is optimal for natural
buyers to buy a house when the state of the economy is st and zero otherwise. The indicator
function Jr(st) is equal to one if it is optimal for natural renters to buy a house when the
state of the economy is st and is equal to zero otherwise.
The laws of motion for the fraction of home owners, home sellers, natural home buyers
and natural renters in the population are given by:
ht+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)ht + q(st)
￿
(bt + ￿rt)J




ut+1 = (ut + ￿ht)(1 ￿ p(st)), (4.14)
bt+1 = (bt + ￿rt)[1 ￿ q(st)J
b(st)], (4.15)
rt+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)rt[1 ￿ q(st)J
r(st)] + p(st)(ut + ￿ht). (4.16)
22The matching technology There is a technology that governs matches between buyers
and sellers. Since agents can only own one home, only natural renters and natural buyers
can potentially buy homes:
Buyers(st) = (bt + ￿rt)J
b(st) + rt(1 ￿ ￿)J
r(st). (4.17)
There is no short selling and homeowners only sell when the match with their home goes
sour. It follows that the fraction of the population that are sellers is given by:
Sellers(st) = ut + ￿ht. (4.18)
When a match occurs, the transactions price is determined by generalized Nash bargain-
ing. The bargaining power of buyers and sellers is ￿ and 1 ￿ ￿, respectively. Matches can
occur between a seller and a natural buyer or a natural renter. In the ￿rst case the price
paid by the natural buyer, P b(st), is:
P
b(st) = ￿ ￿ P
b(st) + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ P
u. (4.19)
In the second case, the price paid by the natural renter, P r(st), is:
P
r(st) = ￿ ￿ P
r(st) + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ P
u. (4.20)
The average price received by a home seller, P(st), is given by:
P(st) =
(bt + ￿rt)Jb(st)P b(st) + rt(1 ￿ ￿)Jr(st)P r(st)
(bt + ￿rt)Jb(st) + rt(1 ￿ ￿)Jr(st)
. (4.21)




The probabilities of selling (p(st)) and buying (q(st)) a house are given by:
p(st) = m(st)=Sellers(st), (4.23)
q(st) = m(st)=Buyers(st). (4.24)
4.1. Solution Algorithm
In this subsection we discuss our algorithm for solving the model. We begin with the steady
state and then show how to solve the model given arbitrary initial conditions.
23Steady State It can be shown that the model economy has a unique steady state in which
the fraction of the di⁄erent types of agents is constant. We now solve for the steady-state
values of the probability of buying and selling a home (p and q) and the fraction of the
di⁄erent agents in the population (h, u, b, and r).
We choose values for the parameters ￿, ￿ and k. We choose a value for ￿ so that the
probabilities of buying and selling a house coincide in the steady state:
p = q.
Equations (4.23) and (4.22) imply that p = q = ￿. This fact, together with equations (4.2)
and (4.15) imply that the steady state number of natural buyers is given by:
b =
(1 ￿ ￿)￿(1 ￿ k)
￿ + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
.
We then solve for r, u, and h, as functions of ￿, ￿ and k using (4.2), (4.14) and (4.1).
The fact that p = q implies that the number of buyers is equal to the number of sellers
(equations (4.23) and (4.24)). Since there are u + ￿r home sellers and b + ￿r buyers in the
steady state we set ￿ so that:
u + ￿h = b + ￿r.
Given the values of p and q we can now solve for the steady-state values of the purchase
price, the reservation price of a buyer, and the value functions of the di⁄erent agents evaluated
in the steady state: P, P b, H, U, B and R. To do so we use the steady state versions of
equations (4.3), (4.4), (4.5), (4.6), (4.8), (4.9), (4.19), (4.20), and (4.21) and the fact that in
the steady state B = Bbuy and R = Rrent.
Transitional Dynamics We assume that at time T = 2000 the system has converged
to the steady state. Consequently, we obtain an approximate solution because it takes an
in￿nite number of periods for the model economy to converge to the steady state.
Let the set S denote all the values of the state variable st that occur along the transition
path. First, guess that Jb(st) = 1 and Jr(st) = 0 for all st 2 S. Second, using the
initial conditions s0 = fh0;b0g and equations (4.13) through (4.16), compute the sequence
of values of ht, ut, bt, and rt. Third, use equations (4.17), (4.18), (4.23), (4.22), and (4.24)
to compute the values of p(st) and q(st) for st 2 S. Fourth, assume that: H(sT) = H,
U(sT) = U, B(sT) = B, and R(sT) = R. Then use equations (4.3) to (4.12) and (4.21)
24to solve backwards for fH(st), U(st), B(st), R(st);P(st)g for t = 1 to T. Finally, verify
whether the guesses for Jb(st) and Jr(st) for st 2 S describe the optimal behavior of buyers
and sellers along the proposed transition path. If not, revise the guesses for Jb(st) and Jr(st)
until a consistent solution is obtained.
4.2. Experiments
We illustrate the properties of the model through a series of experiments.
An expected improvement in fundamentals We ￿rst consider the same experiment
that we study in the frictionless model but with homogeneous beliefs. At time zero agents
suddenly anticipate that, with probability ￿, the utility of owning a home rises from " to
"￿ > ". It is easy to show that there are no transition dynamics and the economy converges
immediately to a new steady state with a higher price. So, when beliefs are homogeneous, an-
ticipated future changes in fundamentals are immediately re￿ ected in today￿ s price. Matching
frictions per se do not produce interesting price dynamics, at least in the experiment studied
here.
Transitional dynamics We now study an experiment that highlights the e⁄ect of an
exogenous increase in the number of buyers on home prices. The resulting intuition is useful
for understanding the results that we obtain when we incorporate social dynamics into the
model. Suppose that the fraction of natural buyers in the population is initially higher than
its steady state value, b0 > b. Since r0 = 1 ￿ k ￿ b0, the fraction of natural renters in the
population is initially lower than its steady state value. We denote by s the steady state
value of the state variables: s = fb;hg and by s0 = fb0;hg the time-zero value of the state
variables. Equations (4.22), (4.23) and (4.24) imply that the time-zero probability of buying
a house is lower than it is in steady state: q(s0) < q(s). The time-zero probability of selling
is higher than it is in steady state: p(s0) > p(s).
To illustrate the transition dynamics of the model we consider a numerical example based
on parameter values summarized in Table 1. We use the same values for ￿, w, and " used
in Section 3. We set the stock of houses, k, equal to 0:65, which coincides with the average
fraction of homeowners in the United States over the period 1965 to 2010. We set "r, "b,
and w to one. We set ￿ to 0:02. This value of ￿, together with the values of ￿ and k and
the assumption that the probability of buying and selling a home are the same in the steady
25state, implies that ￿ is equal to 0:0102. This value of ￿ implies that home owners sell their
house on average every eight years. We set the matching function parameter ￿ to 0:13. This
value implies that the average time to sell a house in the steady state is 7:5 months. We
set the matching parameter ￿ and the bargaining parameter ￿ to 0:5 so as to treat buyers
and sellers symmetrically. We set the reservation price of the seller to ￿ P u = 1. This value
is lower than the steady state reservation price of natural buyers, so that it is optimal for
natural buyers to buy in the steady state. Finally, we set ￿ = 42 , a value which implies that
the steady state utility of a natural renter who buys a home is 20 percent lower than that
of a natural home buyer. Our assumptions imply that it is not optimal for natural renters
to buy homes in the steady state.
We assume that the number of natural buyers at time zero is 50 percent above its steady
state level. Figure 5 depicts the model￿ s transition dynamics. Home prices are initially
high and converge to the steady state from above. In addition, the paths for prices and the
number of buyers mirror each other closely. To understand these properties notice that the
utility of a home seller converges to the steady state from above (U(st+1) > U(s)), a result
that re￿ ects two forces. First, because the number of buyers is high during the transition,
the probability of selling is higher than in the steady state. Second, the price received by
the seller is higher than in the steady state.
We now discuss the intuition for why P(st) > P(s). Along the transition path only
natural buyers want to buy houses, so the transactions price, P(st) is given by:
P(st) = ￿ ￿ P
b(st) + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ P
u.
Since ￿ P u is exogenous, movements in P(st) are determined by movements in ￿ P b(st). Equation
(4.8) implies that ￿ P b(st) is an increasing function of H(st+1) and U(st+1) and a decreasing
function of B(st+1). Since U(st+1) is greater than U(s), equation (4.3) implies that H(st+1) >
H(s). In addition, the value function of a natural buyer approaches the steady state from
below. The basic reason for why B(st+1) < B(s) is that the probability of realizing the
surplus from buying a home is low along the transition to the steady state (q(st) < q(s)).
Since H(st+1) and U(st+1) are above the steady state and B(st+1) is below its steady state
value, it follows from equation (4.8) that the reservation price must be above its steady state
value, ￿ P b(st) > ￿ P b(s).
In summary, in this experiment an increase in the initial number of buyers reduces the
probability of buying a house and raises the probability of selling a house. In addition, it
26lowers the utility of buyers, raises the utility of sellers, and generates prices that are above
their steady state value.
These results suggest that a boom-bust episode occurs if, for some reason, there is a
persistent increase in the number of buyers followed by a persistent decrease. In the next
section we show that social dynamics can generate the required movements in the number
of buyers without observable movements in fundamentals.
5. A matching model with social dynamics
In this section we consider an economy that incorporates the social dynamics described in
Section 3 into the model with matching frictions described in Section 4. We use this model
to study the same basic experiment considered in Section 3. Suppose that before time zero
the economy is in a steady state with no uncertainty. At time zero agents learn that, with
a small probability ￿, the value of " will change permanently to a new level "￿. Agents
agree about the value of ￿ but disagree about the probability distribution for "￿. Agents
receive no information that is useful for updating their priors about the distribution of "￿.
Once uncertainty is resolved agents become homogeneous in terms of their beliefs. At that
point the economy coincides with the one studied in the previous section where the utility of
owning a home is "￿. The economy then converges to a steady state from initial conditions
that are determined by social dynamics and the timing of the resolution of uncertainty.
Agents￿expectations about "￿ depend on whether they are infected, cured or vulnerable.
In addition agents can be home owners, home sellers, natural buyers, or natural renters. So,









t to denote the fraction of the population of type j agents who are homeowners,
home sellers, natural home buyers, and natural renters, respectively. The index j denotes
whether the agent is infected, cured or vulnerable: j 2 fi;c;vg.
As in Section 4, agents are subject to preference shocks which can turn natural renters
into natural buyers and home owners into home sellers. The timing of events within a period
is as follows. First, uncertainty about "￿ is realized or not. Second, preference shocks occur.
With probability ￿ home owners become home sellers. With probability ￿ natural renters
become natural buyers. Third, social interactions occur and agents potentially change their
views. Fourth, transactions occur.
27Population dynamics To solve the model we must keep track of the fraction of the
di⁄erent types of agents in the model. To streamline our exposition we focus here on the
law of motion for the fraction of natural renters who are vulnerable. In the appendix we
describe the population dynamics for the other agents in the economy. The mechanics of
these dynamics are similar to those which we now describe.
We denote the fraction of vulnerable natural renters at the beginning of the period, after





t+1, respectively. At the beginning of the period, a fraction ￿ of the







Next, social interactions occur. A fraction ￿cvct of the vulnerable natural renters become
cured and a fraction ￿ivit become infected. Consequently, the fraction of vulnerable natural
















Transactions occur at the end of the period. Let (uv
t)
00 denote the fraction of the vul-
nerable natural sellers that remain after social interactions occur. All of these agents put
their homes up for sale but only a fraction p(st) succeed in actually selling their home. So
the total number of sellers is p(st)(uv
t)
00. These sellers become natural renters. Let Jr;v(st)
denote an indicator function that is equal to one if it is optimal for a vulnerable natural
renter to buy a home when the state of the economy is st and zero otherwise. The number of
vulnerable natural renters who try to purchase a home is equal to: Jr;v(st)(rv
t)
00. A fraction
q(st) of these agents succeed and become natural home owners. So, the number of vulnerable














We now describe the value functions of the di⁄erent agents in the economy. We begin by
displaying the value functions that are relevant after uncertainty about "￿ is realized. We
then discuss the value functions that are relevant before "￿ is realized.
Value functions after the realization of uncertainty We use upper bars to denote the
value functions that apply after the resolution of uncertainty. These value functions depend
28on the realized value of "￿ and on the state of the economy, st. Since the number of home
owners adds up to k and the number of renters to 1 ￿ k, we can summarize the state of the






















Let ￿ H("￿;st), ￿ U("￿;st), ￿ B("￿;st), and ￿ R("￿;st) denote the value function of a home
owner, home seller, a natural buyer, and a natural renter, respectively. In addition, P("￿;st),
P b("￿;st), and P r("￿;st) denote the average price received by home sellers, the price paid by
natural home buyers and the price paid by natural renters, respectively.
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￿;st) + ￿ ￿ R("
￿;st+1)] + [1 ￿ p(st)]￿ ￿ U("
￿;st+1).
We denote by ￿ Brent("￿;st) and ￿ Bbuy("￿;st) the value function of a natural buyer who rents
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+[1 ￿ q(st)] ￿ B
rent("
￿;st).
The value function ￿ B("￿;st) is given by:
￿ B("





We denote by ￿ Rrent("￿;st) and ￿ Rbuy("￿;st) the value function of a natural renter associated
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+[1 ￿ q(st)] ￿ R
rent("
￿;st).
In the previous equation we assume that the ￿xed cost (k"￿) paid by the natural renter for
buying a home is proportional to the realized vale of "￿. This assumption ensures that it is
29optimal for a natural renter to rent a home in the steady state of the economy regardless of
the realized value of "￿. The value function ￿ R("￿;st) is given by:
￿ R("





The reservation prices of natural buyers and renters and the average transaction price are
computed as in Section 4 using equations (4.8), (4.12), (4.19), (4.20), and (4.21). However,
these equations must be modi￿ed by replacing " with "￿.
Value functions before the realization of uncertainty Let Hj(st), Uj(st), Bj(st),
and Rj(st) denote the value functions before uncertainty is realized of a type j home owner,
home seller, natural buyer and natural renter, respectively. In addition, P(st), P b;j(st), and
P r;j(st) denote the average price received by home sellers, the average price paid by natural
home buyers and the average price paid by natural renters, respectively.
The expectations operator Ej [V j (st+1)] denotes the expectation of a generic value func-
tion V j(st+1) based on the pdf of a type j agent:
E
j[V








Here ￿ V ("￿;st+1) denotes the value function after the realization of uncertainty.
The value functions of a type j home owner and home seller are given by:
H








j(st) = p(st)fP(st) + ￿E
j[R
j(st+1)]g + [1 ￿ p(st)]￿E
j[U
j(st+1)]. (5.3)
We denote by Brent;j(st) and Bbuy;j(st) the value function of a natural buyer of type j
associated with renting and buying, respectively. These functions can be written as:
B
rent;j(st) = "
























Recall that this price makes the agent indi⁄erent between buying and renting.
We denote by Rrent;j(st) and Rbuy;j(st) the value function of a type j natural renter who
rents and buys, respectively. These functions can be written as:
R
rent;j(st) = "
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j(st+1)g ￿ ￿". (5.7)



























The number of homes sold is given by equation (4.22). The probabilities of buying and
selling are given by equations (4.23) and (4.24), respectively.
Transactions prices There are six di⁄erent possible transaction prices. The ￿rst three
prices arise from a match between a home seller and the three di⁄erent types of natural
buyers:
P
b;j(st) = ￿ ￿ P
b;j(st) + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ P
u. (5.10)
The remaining three prices arise from a match between a home seller and the three di⁄erent
types of natural renters:
P
r;j(st) = ￿ ￿ P
r;j(st) + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ P
u. (5.11)























Here Jb;j(st) is an indicator function that is equal to one if it is optimal for a type
j natural buyer to buy a home when the state of the economy is st and zero otherwise.
Similarly, Jr;j(st) is an indicator function that is equal to one if it is optimal for a type j
natural renter to buy a home when the state of the economy is st and zero otherwise.
5.1. Solving the model
In this subsection we describe a solution algorithm to compute the equilibrium of the economy
along a path in which uncertainty has not been realized.
We begin by considering case 1. In this case, absent resolution of uncertainty, all agents
eventually become cured. Since Ec("￿) = ", if the path under consideration converges then
it converges to the initial steady state of the economy.
We can use the algorithm described in Section 4to solve for the steady state associated
with all possible realizations of "￿ and for the values of the value functions along the transition
to the steady state for any initial condition st and realized value of "￿: ￿ H("￿;st), ￿ U("￿;st),
￿ B("￿;st), and ￿ R("￿;st). As in Section 4 we denote by S the set of the values of the state
variable st that occur along the equilibrium path.









0 for j = i;c;v. We choose these conditions so that the fractions
of homeowners, home sellers, natural buyers and natural renters are equal to their initial
steady state values. In addition, we assume that all agents are vulnerable except for a small
number, ￿, of infected and cured renters: hv
0 = h and bv
0 = b, uv
0 = u, ri
0 = rc
0 = ￿, and
rv
0 = 1 ￿ 2￿.
Second, we guess values of the indicator functions that summarize the optimal decisions
of natural buyers and natural renters, Jb;j(st) and Jr;j(st) for all st 2 S. For example,
Jb;j(st) = 1 for all j, Jr;i(st) = 1;Jr;c(st) = Jr;v(st) = 0 for all st 2 S.
Third, we use equations (A.1) through (A.20) in the appendix to compute the path for













t and equations (4.23), (4.24), (5.8), and (5.9), to compute the values of p(st) and q(st) for
st 2 S.
Fourth, we compute the limiting value of the value function of all agents along the path
in which uncertainty is not realized. The system of equations that de￿nes these limiting
values is given by equation (A.21)-(A.27) in the appendix.
Fifth, we solve backwards for all the value functions using equations (5.2) to (5.7) and
(5.10) to (5.12). As in Section 4 we assume that the economy has reached its steady state
at time T = 2000. Computing Ej[V j(st+1)], de￿ned in equation (5.1), where V j is a generic
value function, requires solving the steady state that obtains when uncertainty is realized for
each possible value of "￿ and solving backwards from the steady state to obtain ￿ V ("￿;st+1)
for each possible value of "￿. We then use the pdf of agent j over "￿ to compute the expected




Sixth, we verify that the initial guesses for the indicator functions Jb;j(st) and Jr;i(st)
describe the optimal behavior of buyers and sellers along the proposed equilibrium path. If
not, we revise the guesses until we obtain a consistent solution.
With one exception we use the same algorithm to solve for the equilibrium in case 2. The
exception is that in this case, absent resolution of uncertainty, all agents become infected.
Along the path on which uncertainty is not realized the economy converges to a steady state
which is equivalent to an economy in which "￿ = Ei("￿). To compute this steady state we
guess and verify whether it is optimal for infected natural renters and natural buyers to buy
a home. In our particular numerical example, it is optimal for them to do so.
5.2. Quantitative properties of the model
We illustrate the properties of the model using two numerical examples corresponding to
cases 1 and 2 in Section 3. The parameters governing social dynamics are the same as in
Section 3. The parameters of the matching model are the same as in Section 4. Table 1
contains a summary of the parameter values that we use.
Case 1 In this case the pdf of the cured agents has the lowest entropy (ec < ei < ev). The
resulting social dynamics are displayed in panel (a) of Figure 2. Figure 6 describes various
features of the model along a path in which uncertainty is not realized. The key features
of this path can be summarized as follows. First, average home prices rise and then fall
33as the infection waxes and wanes. Strikingly, even though agents have perfect foresight up
to the resolution of long-run uncertainty, the initial rise in price is very small. Second, the
average transaction price is highly correlated with the number of potential buyers. Third,
the number of transactions is positively correlated with the average home price. Fourth, as
prices rise there is a ￿sellers market￿in the sense that the probability of selling is high and
the probability of buying is low.
Consistent with our discussion in Section 4, movements in the number of potential buyers
are the key driver of price dynamics in the model. Over time the number of potential buyers
rises from 4:7 percent to a peak value of 13 percent of the population and then declines.
In the boom phase of the cycle the number of potential buyers rises for two reasons.
First, in contrast to the model without social dynamics, some natural renters, those who
have become infected, want to buy homes. At the peak of the infection roughly 16 percent
of natural renters are infected and account for 37 percent of potential buyers (see Figure 6).
Second, as more buyers enter the market, the average amount of time to purchase a house
rises from 7:5 to 20 months, while the average time to sell a house drops from 7:5 months to
2:8 months. To understand these results, recall that the probabilities of buying and selling a
home depends on the ratio of buyers to sellers (see equations (4.23) and (4.24)). Other things
equal, the in￿ ow of infected natural renters into the housing market increases the number
of buyers, thereby lowering the probability of buying a house and raising the probability of
selling a house. The latter e⁄ect reduces the stock of home sellers, thus reinforcing the fall in
the probability of buying and the rise in the probability of selling a house. As the infection
wanes, the number of buyers falls and the number of sellers rises, so the probabilities of
buying and selling a house return to their steady state values.
To understand how changes in the number of buyers and sellers a⁄ect prices, we exploit
the intuition about transition dynamics discussed in Section 4. The average purchase price
is a weighted average of the price paid by four types of agents: infected natural renters and
infected, cured and vulnerable natural buyers.
The price paid by each of these agents depends positively on their reservation price (see
equations (5.10) and (5.11)). Each reservation price is the di⁄erence between the value to
that agent of being a home owner and a home buyer (see equations (5.5) and (5.7)). When
the probability of buying is low, the value functions of all potential buyers are low because
it is more di¢ cult to realize the utility gains from purchasing a home. When the probability
34of selling is high, the value functions of home sellers are high because it takes less time to
sell a home. The value functions of home owners are also high because with probability ￿
they become home sellers.
As the infection takes hold the probability of buying falls and the probability of selling
rises. As a result, the reservation prices of the di⁄erent potential buyers rise, leading to a
rise in purchase prices.
From Figure 6 we see that the infected natural buyers pay the highest price. These agents
derive a high utility from owning a home and have a high expectation of "￿. The next highest
price is paid by cured natural buyers. These agents also derive a high utility from owning a
home but they have a lower expectation of "￿ than infected natural buyers. Vulnerable and
cured natural buyers have the same expectation of "￿ so they pay the same price. Infected
natural renters pay the lowest price. On one hand these agents enjoy the house less than
natural buyers. On the other hand, they have a higher expectation of "￿ than cured and
vulnerable natural buyers. For the case being considered the ￿rst e⁄ect outweighs the second
e⁄ect.
The presence of infected natural renters has two e⁄ects. Taking the prices paid by other
agents as given, the presence of infected natural renters reduces the average price. However,
the presence of infected renters increases the number of potential buyers thereby creating a
congestion e⁄ect that reduces the probability of buying a home. As discussed above, this
reduction increases the transactions price paid by the other agents in the system. In our
example, the second e⁄ect dominates the ￿rst e⁄ect.
Quantifying the congestion e⁄ect One way to quantify the importance of the conges-
tion e⁄ect is to redo the experiment but not allow infected renters to purchase homes. By
construction, in this experiment the probability of buying and selling a home is constant,
since the number of potential buyers and sellers is una⁄ected by the infection. It turns out
that the average sale price is hardly a⁄ected by the infection. The only reason for average
prices to go up in this experiment is a rise in the reservation price of infected natural buyers.
This price is the di⁄erence between the value of a being a new home owner who is infected
((1 ￿ ￿)Hi(st+1) + ￿Ui(st+1)) and the value of being an infected natural buyer (Bi(st+1)).
The value of becoming a home owner increases if a vulnerable agent becomes infected. But
the value of being an infected natural buyer also increases because an infected agent has a
high expected value of "￿. In contrast to the situation where the congestion e⁄ect is opera-
35tive, here the probability of buying a home remains constant, so there is no countervailing
e⁄ect on the infected natural buyers￿value functions. The net result is a small increase in
the reservation price of infected buyers.
What happens when uncertainty is resolved? The two graphs in Figure 7 show the
average behavior of the price if uncertainty is realized in years ￿ve and ten, respectively.
The solid line depicts the actual house price up to the period when uncertainty is realized.
When uncertainty is realized there are six possible price paths that can occur, one for each
of the possible realized values of "￿. The dashed (dotted) line shows the average price path
that infected (vulnerable/cured) agents expect to occur after uncertainty is realized.
On average, infected agents expect prices to rise and cured/vulnerable agents expect
prices to fall. Interestingly, neither agent expects the price to converge immediately to its
steady value after uncertainty is realized. The reason is that, when uncertainty is resolved,
the number of buyers exceeds its steady state value. For every value of "￿ the transition to
the steady state is governed by the transition dynamics of the homogeneous expectations
model. As emphasized in Section 4, when the number of buyers exceeds its steady state
value the price converges to its steady state value from above.
If uncertainty is realized in year ￿ve, the number of infected natural renters is small and
the number of potential buyers is close to its steady state value. As a result, there is only
a modest role for transition dynamics and the expected initial price is close to its expected
steady state value. If uncertainty is realized in year ten, the number of infected natural
renters is large and the number of potential buyers is substantially above its steady state
value. As a result, the expected initial price is substantially above its expected steady-state
value.
The right-hand graph in Figure 7 helps us understand why a cured or vulnerable natural
buyer is willing to buy a house even at the peak of the infection (year ten) when the price
is much higher than the steady state price that these agents expect. Even if uncertainty
is resolved in the following period, agents expect the fall in the price to be relatively small
because the number of potential home buyers is signi￿cantly above its steady state value.
Even if a home buyer becomes a home seller, the expected capital loss on the house is expected
to be relatively small. As a consequence, the gains from living in the house outweigh the
expected capital loss.
Infected agents expect a large capital gain when uncertainty is realized. This expected
36gain is so large that it induces not only natural buyers but also natural renters to try to
purchase a home. Under normal circumstances natural renters would not buy a home. They
are willing to do so because the expected gains from speculation outweigh their disposition
to rent rather than buy.
Finally, Figure 7 shows that there is a discontinuous jump up or down in housing prices
when uncertainty is realized. We do not observe these types of jumps in the data. The
discontinuity re￿ ects the stark nature of how information is revealed in the model. This
feature can be eliminated if information about long-run fundamentals gradually percolates
throughout the economy as in Du¢ e, Giroux and Manso (2010).
Case 2 In this case the pdf of the infected agents has the lowest entropy (ei < ec <
ev). The same economic forces discussed above are at work here. The key di⁄erence is
that, absent resolution of uncertainty, the entire population becomes infected (see panel
(b) of Figure 2). As a consequence, the number of infected renters rises and remains high
until uncertainty is resolved. So, the number of potential buyers remains high and the
congestion e⁄ect is operative for a much longer period of time. Not surprisingly, in case 2
the probability of buying (selling) is much lower (higher) for a longer period of time than in
case 1. Consequently, it takes much longer in case 2 for the volume of transactions to return
to its steady state level.
Finally, Figure 8 displays the price path absent resolution of uncertainty. As in case
1, the price rises before year ten, albeit to a higher level, re￿ ecting the larger number of
potential buyers in the system. The price stays high until uncertainty is resolved.
Expected price paths We now discuss the properties of the time-zero expected time-t
price, E
j
0(Pt), for j = i;c. This price is computed as follows:
E
j











The ￿rst term in equation (5.13) re￿ ects the possibility that uncertainty has not yet been
resolved by the end of time t. The probability of this event, (1￿￿)t, is multiplied by Pt, the
price at time t in that state of the world. The second term in equation (5.13) re￿ ects the
possibility that uncertainty is resolved at time ￿ ￿ t, an event that occurs with probability
￿(1 ￿ ￿)￿￿1. This probability is multiplied by Ej [P￿
t ("￿;s￿)], the price that agent j expects
37to occur at time t if uncertainty is realized at time ￿ and the utility of owning a home is "￿.
The time-t price depends on ￿ because the time-t state of the economy depends on when
uncertainty is realized as that determines the transition path to the steady state. Finally,
since agents di⁄er in their expectations about "￿, the expected value of Pt("￿;s￿) also di⁄ers
across agents.
Panel (a) of Figure 9 depicts, for case 1, the price paths expected by di⁄erent agents.
Infected agents expect prices to rise rapidly until year ten and to remain high. In contrast,
cured agents also expect prices to rise up to year ten, although by less than infected agents.
Thereafter, cured agents expect prices to revert to their old steady state levels.
Panel (b) of Figure 9 depicts, for case 2, the price paths expected by di⁄erent agents.
The key property to notice is that while there are quantitative di⁄erences the patterns are
remarkably similar. Cured agents expect a boom that is followed by a bust while infected
agents expect a boom that is not followed by a bust. Qualitatively this is the same result
we obtained with the frictionless model of Section 3. Once again, an econometrician taking
repeated samples from our data would see both boom-busts and booms that are not followed
by busts. The boom-bust episodes occur in economies where the cured agents happen to
be correct. The booms that are not followed by busts occur in economies in which infected
agents happen to be correct.
6. Conclusion
Boom-bust episodes are pervasive in housing markets. They occur in di⁄erent countries and
in di⁄erent time periods. These episodes are hard to understand from the perspective of
conventional models in which agents have homogeneous expectations.
In this paper we propose a model in which agents have di⁄erent views about long-run
fundamentals. Social interactions can generate temporary increases in the fraction of agents
who hold a particular view about long-run fundamentals. The resulting dynamics can pro-
duce boom-bust cycles as well as booms that are not followed by busts. The pattern observed
in a given episode depends on which set of agents happens to be correct in its views.
At the core of our matching model is the notion that booms are associated with new
entrants into the market who drive up housing prices. In the model these entrants are renters
who would not normally be disposed to buy a house. They do so because they expect a large
capital gain. This core feature of our model is consistent with evidence that housing booms
38are accompanied by an in￿ ux of new buyers. Data from the American Housing Survey
compiled by the U.S. Census Bureau shows that the fraction of homes owned by individuals
25 years old and younger increased from 18 percent in 1997 to 25 percent in 2005. This rise
surely re￿ ects an in￿ ux of new buyers. Similarly, Ortalo-Magne and Rady (1999) document
that there was an in￿ ux of ￿rst-time buyers during the 1990 housing boom in the U.K.
Our model abstracts from ￿nancial frictions. But it is clear to us that the ability of
many young buyers to buy a home is in￿ uenced by downpayment requirements and credit
conditions. An implication of our model is that if young buyers are infected but cannot buy a
house, say because they are credit constrained, boom-bust cycles in housing prices are greatly
muted. Indeed, this situation corresponds to the experiment in our model where we lock
out infected natural renters from the housing market. In this case there are no congestion
e⁄ects and there are no pronounced boom-bust cycles. But there is no presumption that a
policy of requiring high downpayments would be welfare improving because this policy would
presumably apply to both natural buyers and natural renters. More generally, policies aimed
at curbing rapid price increases are not obviously welfare improving in our model because,
in the end, we do not know who is right about the future: the vulnerable, the cured, or the
infected.
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41A. Appendix
In this appendix we describe the laws of motion for the fraction of the population accounted
for by the twelve types of agents in the model of Section 5. The values of ￿lj, which depend
on the ratio of the entropies of the pdfs of agents l and j, are de￿ned in equation (3.3).
Recall that ￿ic = 0 in case 1 and ￿ci = 0 in case two.
Homeowners We denote the fraction of home owners of type j (j = c;i;v) in the begin-
ning of the period, after preference shocks occur, after social interactions occur, and after








t+1, respectively. The laws of motion for











































































00, j = i;c;v. (A.5)
Home sellers We denote the fraction of home sellers of type j (j = c;i;v) in the begin-
ning of the period, after preference shocks occur, after social interactions occur, and after








t+1, respectively. The laws of motion for








































































00, j = i;c;v. (A.10)
Natural buyers We denote the fraction of natural buyers of type j (j = c;i;v) in the
beginning of the period, after preference shocks occur, after social interactions occur, and








t+1, respectively. The laws of motion








































































00, j = i;c;v. (A.15)
Natural renters We denote the fraction of natural renters of type j (j = c;i;v) in the
beginning of the period, after preference shocks occur, after social interactions occur, and








t+1, respectively. The laws of motion








































































00, j = i;c;v. (A.20)
43Limiting steady state when uncertainty is not realized We denote by ￿ H("￿), ￿ U("￿),
￿ B("￿) and ￿ R("￿) the steady state of the value functions of di⁄erent agents in the economy
when uncertainty is realized and the realized utility of owning a home is "￿. These values
are computed by solving the system of equations (4.3), (4.4), (4.5), (4.6), (4.9), (4.8), and
(4.21), setting B = Bbuy and R = Rrent and replacing " in equation (4.3) with the di⁄erent
possible values of "￿.
The limiting value functions of di⁄erent agents along a path in which uncertainty is not
resolved can be obtained by solving the following system of equations for Hj, Uj, Bj, Rj for
j = i;v;c and ￿ P b;c and P:
H






j[(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ H("
￿) + ￿ ￿ U("
￿)]g, (A.21)
U
j = pfP + ￿[(1 ￿ ￿)R
j + ￿E
j ￿ R("
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Recall that in the limit all agents are cured so the price of a home is determined by the
reservation price of the natural buyer:
￿ P





(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ H("
￿) + ￿ ￿ U("




P = ￿ ￿ P
b;c + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ P
u. (A.26)
The probability of buying and selling are given by:
p = q = ￿. (A.27)
44FIGURE 1: Real Home Prices in 18 OECD Countries
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Note: Source, OECD. Each series is a nominal housing price index divided by the local CPI.
The resulting series is normalized to have a mean of 100 over the full sample. Data are
shown on a logarithmic scale. Green bars indicate real estate booms, red bars indicate real
estate busts, as de￿ned in the text.
45FIGURE 2: Social Dynamics
























































Note: The graphs show the evolution of the populations of each type of agent due to social
dynamics. In Case 1, the priors of cured agents have the lowest entropy, and the priors of
the vulnerable agents have the highest entropy. In Case 2, the priors of infected agents have
the lowest entropy, and the priors of the vulnerable agents have the highest entropy.
46FIGURE 3: Equilibrium of Frictionless Model, Case 1
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Note: The graphs show a variety of paths for the frictionless model with social dynamics in
Case 1, in which the priors of cured agents have the lowest entropy, and the priors of the
vulnerable agents have the highest entropy. The number of infected agents, the price of a
house, the monthly expected rate of return, and transactions volume are all computed under
the assumption that uncertainty is not realized. The expected price paths are the expected
values of the house price at each date, as of time 0, given the priors of the di⁄erent agents.
47FIGURE 4: Equilibrium of Frictionless Model, Case 2
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Note: The graphs show a variety of paths for the frictionless model with social dynamics in
Case 2, in which the priors of infected agents have the lowest entropy, and the priors of the
vulnerable agents have the highest entropy. The number of infected agents, the price of a
house, the monthly expected rate of return, and transactions volume are all computed under
the assumption that uncertainty is not realized. The expected price paths are the expected
values of the house price at each date, as of time 0, given the priors of the di⁄erent agents.
48FIGURE 5: Transitional Dynamics in a Matching Model
(a) Prices, Buyers, Sellers and Transaction Probabilities






















































Note: The ￿gures illustrate the transition dynamics associated with the matching model,
when there is an initial increase in the number of natural home buyers. Buyers indicates the
number of agents who try to buy a home, while sellers indicates the number of agents who
try to sell a home. Price is the average price at which homes are sold. B￿ s reservation price
is the reservation price of a natural home buyer. Figure 5 continues on the next page.
49FIGURE 5: Transitional Dynamics in a Matching Model
(b) Utility Levels of the Di⁄erent Agents













































Note: The ￿gures illustrate the transition dynamics associated with the matching model,
when there is an initial increase in the number of natural home buyers. The utility levels of
the four types of agents are indicated. Figure 5 continues on the next page.
50FIGURE 5: Transitional Dynamics in a Matching Model
(c) Agent Populations, Transactions Volume and Transaction Probabilities






















































Note: The ￿gures illustrate the transition dynamics associated with the matching model,
when there is an initial increase in the number of natural home buyers. The four plots on
the left show the number of agents of each type across the transition path. Sales indicates
the number of transactions.
51FIGURE 6: Equilibrium of Matching Model with Social Dynamics, Case 1






























































(relative to steady state)
years
Note: The ￿gures illustrate equilibrium paths when there is no resolution of uncertainty for
the matching model with social dynamics in Case 1, in which the priors of cured agents have
the lowest entropy, and the priors of the vulnerable agents have the highest entropy. The
number of potential buyers is calculated after preferences shocks have been realized. Here,
bc, bv and bi represent the populations of cured, vulnerable and infected natural buyers, while
ri is the population of infected natural renters. When an infected natural buyer matches
with a seller he pays P bi for a house, a cured or infected natural buyer pays P bc, and an
infected natural renter pays P ri.
52FIGURE 7: Expected Prices after the Resolution of Uncertainty, Case 1
































Note: The ￿gures illustrate the equilibrium price (blue line) if uncertainty is not realized
until the end of years 5 and 10, respectively. The red lines indicate the prices infected agents
would expect to observe after years 5 and 10, if uncertaimty were resolved at those dates.
The green lines indicate the prices the cured and vulernable agents would expect to observe
after years 5 and 10, if uncertaimty were resolved at those dates. The graphs are drawn for
the matching model with social dynamics in Case 1, in which the priors of cured agents have
the lowest entropy, and the priors of the vulnerable agents have the highest entropy.
53FIGURE 8: Equilibrium of Matching Model with Social Dynamics, Case 2







































































(relative to steady state)
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Note: The ￿gures illustrate equilibrium paths when there is no resolution of uncertainty for
the matching model with social dynamics in Case 2, in which the priors of infected agents
have the lowest entropy, and the priors of the vulnerable agents have the highest entropy. The
number of potential buyers is calculated after preferences shocks have been realized. Here,
bc, bv and bi represent the populations of cured, vulnerable and infected natural buyers, while
ri is the population of infected natural renters. When an infected natural buyer matches
with a seller he pays P bi for a house, a cured or infected natural buyer pays P bc, and an
infected natural renter pays P ri.
54FIGURE 9: Expected Price Paths, Matching Model with Social Dynamics


































Note: The graphs show the price paths expected by di⁄erent types of agents at time 0. In
Case 1, the priors of cured agents have the lowest entropy, and the priors of the vulnerable
agents have the highest entropy. In Case 2, the priors of infected agents have the lowest
entropy, and the priors of the vulnerable agents have the highest entropy.
55TABLE 1: Parameter Values, Matching Model
Parameter Value Description
k 0:65 Fraction of homeowners in population
￿ 0:995 Discount factor
" 2:94 Utility of owning a home
"b 1:00 Utility of renting, natural buyer
"r 1:00 Utility of renting, natural renter
w 1:00 Rental rate
￿ 0:0083 Monthly probability that uncertainty is realized
￿ 0:50 Parameter of matching function
￿ 0:13 Parameter of matching function
￿ 0:02 Preference shock, natural renters
￿ 0:0103 Preference shock, home owners
￿ P u 1:00 Reservation price, home sellers
￿ 42 Fixed cost of buying, natural renters
￿ 0:50 Bargaining power of home buyer
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